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Introduction
Empirical tests of purchasing power parity (PPP) are implicitly based on the conditions of symmetry and proportionality of the coefficients of the exchange rateprice relationship: symmetry is said to apply if the coefficients on the domestic and foreign price levels are identical (in absolute value); proportionality applies if the coefficients on both price levels are equal to unity (in absolute value). Most empirical studies, however, do not directly test for the existence of these two conditions; those that do carry out such tests typically fail to find evidence in support of the conditions, although, typically, symmetry is more easily accepted than proportionality (e.g., Cheung and Lai (1993) , Moosa (1994) , Edison, Gagnon and Melick (1997) , Li (1999) , Moon and Perron (2004) , Cerrato and Serantis, (2008) ). Yet, as pointed out by Li (1999, p. 410, original italics) , "their validity is a maintained hypothesis in unit root tests for the long-run PPP using real exchange rates".
1 In this connection, unit root --as well as co-integration --tests have often generated results supportive of long run PPP, although the results are subject to considerable uncertainty, reflecting structural changes, varying degrees of volatility related to different exchange-rate regimes, and other possible misspecifications that may arise using long sample periods. At the same time, as pointed out by Taylor and Taylor (2004) in their survey of the PPP literature, most empirical studies tend to reject short run PPP.
2 PPP, however, is a fundamental building block of international economics and finance theory; it is, therefore, surprising that the support for this basic concept is so weak. In this paper we investigate the possibility that, while the basic PPP relationship does hold, attempts to estimate that relationship have typically been based on an overly-restrictive specification that tends to yield biased estimates. Specifically, we argue that factors other than prices that affect the exchange rate need to be taken into account. These factors could include short run volatility effects, as in Dornbusch overshooting, and medium term structural effects, such as divergences in wage costs or productivity levels. We show that omitting such effects would lead to biased coefficient estimates and, under certain circumstances, these omitted variables would
1 Examples of such unit root tests on PPP include Taylor (1996, 2000) and Enders (2009, pp. 382-84) 2 By short run PPP we mean that a change in prices is rapidly reflected in nominal exchange rates with little or no process of adjustment. Long run PPP is defined as a situation where a change in prices is eventually fully reflected in exchange rates but only after a period of adjustment.
also be expected to generate symmetric, but not proportional, results. A key issue from the point of view of the theory of PPP is the following: Are the coefficients of prices and exchange rates in an exchange rate-price relationship homogeneous of degree one (henceforth, homogeneous) ? If the answer is yes, then changes in the exchange rate result in proportionate changes in prices. There may be other factors affecting PPP that are important in the data, but are not important for the comparativestatic analysis of PPP. If this is the case, then the standard textbook cases obtain.
However, if the price effects themselves are non-homogenous, then standard models are simply built on a false premise.
In what follows, we conduct two experiments. First, we investigate the homogeneity condition for nine euro-area countries as well as for the euro area as a whole. We use monthly data over the sample period 1999:M1 to 2011:M3, a period corresponding to euro-area membership of the nine countries considered. Second, we extend the experiment to include three additional countries --Canada, Japan, and
Mexico --over a longer sample period, 1957:M1 to 2011:M3. Our reference currency in both experiments is the U.S. dollar. We apply a generalized cointegration technique (Hall, Swamy and Tavlas (2012) , Hall, Kenjegaliev, Swamy and Tavlas (2013a) ) based on a time-varying-coefficient regression. The underlying idea of this approach is that the coefficients in a PPP relationship are homogeneous if their bias-free components take unit values even if this relationship may involve omitted and/or variables subject to measurement errors. 3 Therefore, if we find that the bias-free components of the coefficients --we explain below what we mean by bias-free components --of a PPP relationship are homogeneous, then the prices and the exchange rate are cointegrated. Moreover, an appealing feature of this technique is that it is possible to obtain estimates of the time-varying coefficients and to reproduce them in visual form to assess the proportionality and symmetry conditions. There is, of course, a "little pinch" of uncertainty in accurate estimation of bias-free components. This could potentially distort the results of the time-varying coefficients and give misleading deductions. We address this issue in this paper.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the timevarying PPP relationship and the time-varying-coefficients' methodology used to estimate that relationship. Section 3 discusses the concept of generalized cointegration and its relationship to time-varying-coefficient estimation. Section 4 presents the data and estimation results. Section 5 concludes.
Time-varying purchasing power parity
The law of one price states that the prices of identical goods in two countries converted into equivalent currency units will be the same to preclude arbitrage opportunities in both economies. Formally, the standard representation of the law of one price is , 1,...,
where S is the nominal exchange rate (defined as the domestic price of one unit of foreign currency), i P is a domestic price of good i and i FP is a foreign price of that good. The main assumptions here are that the good is tradable and that the market is frictionless.
The general price level in the home economy at time t can be computed by taking a weighted average of all the individual prices (Chen and Engel (2005) ...
The general price level in the foreign economy is 1 1 2 2 1
... 
or, alternatively, 1,..., Swamy, Tavlas, Hall, and Hondroyiannis (2010) ).
Eq. (6a) is one possible view of the world suggesting that the basic relationship between prices and exchange rates is non-homogeneous. However a different view of the world would be one in which homogeneity is maintained, but other factors enter the exchange rate-price relationship. Thus, let us assume that there are factors, such as labor productivity, that enter the PPP relationship. Then, the following relationship may hold:
where the variable Z may create a wedge between the exchange-rate-price relationship over time, but the exchange-rate-price part of relationship (6b) is nevertheless homogeneous. Consequently, Eq. (6b) would be consistent with the comparative static properties of a standard international macro model. Note that Eq. (6b) implies that, in the presence of such factors as differences in productivity levels, the coefficients on the two price variables in (6a) would not be expected to be unity; effectively, such factors act as omitted variables, impacting on the coefficients of the price variables in (6a). Eq. (6b), in contrast, implies that explicitly taking these factors into account yields homogeneity of prices.
Either of these two possibilities can be nested within a version of Eq. (6a) with time-varying coefficients. In logarithmic terms, the two possibilities can both be written as
where lower case letters represent logs of the respective variables of Eq. (6a). Relative PPP implies that there is a proportionate effect on the exchange rate from the two prices.
Eq. (7) can be used to demonstrate the bias that occurs in a standard OLS regression with fixed coefficients. If we take Eq. (7) and rewrite it in the following 
Typically, only the first three terms on the right hand side of Eq. (10) b depend. The lower the absolute change in prices compared to the change in the exchange rate, the higher the values of coefficient difference, and, therefore, past prices dominate in the exchange rate change.
As mentioned, our aim is to test for the existence of homogeneity in Eq. (7); homogeneity requires both coefficients to be equal to unity (although with opposite signs). An attractive element of the time-varying-coefficient regression is that it allows us to display the dynamic evolution of the individual coefficients, which can be analytically evaluated against the null hypotheses without the need of sophisticated statistical tests. As a result, it is convenient to present and examine the evolution of the coefficients in visual form.
Generalized cointegration
The econometric approach we use is provided in detail in (Hall, Swamy and Tavlas (2012 , 2014 ), Hall, Kenjegaliev, Swamy and Tavlas (2013a ); however, as it is a relatively novel approach, we will provide an intuitive account of the ideas used; we also provide references to a formal exposition of the TVC approach used in Appendix A. The approach uses the concepts of generalized cointegration (Hall, Swamy and Tavlas (2012)), and time-varying-coefficient (TVC) estimation (Swamy, Tavlas, Hall and Hondroyiannis (2010) ); this approach allows for the consistent estimation of models in the presence of an unknown true functional form, omitted variables, and measurement errors.
Both generalised cointegration and TVC estimation proceed from an important theorem first established by Swamy and Mehta (1975) , which was subsequently confirmed by Granger (2008 This theorem underlies the idea of the concept called generalised cointegration (Hall, Swamy and Tavlas (2012) ), which relaxes some of the stringent assumptions of standard cointegration analysis. The particular version of generalized cointegration implemented here does two things. First, it allows for the possibility that we may have important omitted variables. Second, it solves the unknown functional-form problem.
That is, under generalized cointegration we are able to estimate bias-free relationships among a set of variables even (i) if we do not know the true, underlying functional form and (ii) even if there are missing variables. Specifically, generalized cointegration works by correcting a relationship for specification errors (such as omitted-variable biases).
Underlying generalized cointegration is a new way of thinking about, and testing for, cointegration that emphasises the properties of the real world rather than a particular model. If, in the real world, a causal cointegrating vector exists which determines a variable, say, the real exchange rate, then, obviously, if one of the explanatory variables (say X) in that relationship changes, the real exchange rate will also change. This circumstance implies that the partial derivative of the real exchange rate with respect to X is non-zero. Thus, if we had a way of obtaining consistent estimate of this partial derivative and testing to see if it is significantly different from zero, this would give us a way of testing for the presence of cointegration in the real world (rather than just among an arbitrary set of variables). So, we might be able to assert that there is a stable relationship between, say, two variables in the real world, even though we do not know its exact functional form and/or all the variables that comprise that relationship. This would still be a very useful statement to make from a policy perspective, although, obviously, not as useful as knowing the complete form of that relationship.
Of course, this may appear as asking a great deal of an estimation technique.
However, that is precisely what TVC estimation aims to provide (Swamy, Tavlas, Hall and Hondroyiannis (2010) ). This technique builds from the Swamy and Mehta In what follows, we call these biased coefficients the "total effect" coefficients. There are exact mathematical proofs provided for our statements up to this point.
Some parametric assumptions are needed to make TVC estimation fully operational. 5 We make two key assumptions. First, we assume that the time-varying coefficients themselves are determined by a set of stochastic linear equations which make them a function of a set of variables that we call driver (or coefficient-driver)
variables (In what follows, we call these coefficients the "total effects" coefficients).
This is a relatively uncontroversial assumption. Second, we assume that some of these drivers are correlated with the misspecification in the model and some of them are correlated with the time-variation coming from the non-linear (true) functional form.
With this assumption, we can then simply remove the biases from the TVCs by removing the effect of the set of coefficient drivers which are correlated with the misspecification. Effectively, the coefficient drivers absorb omitted-variable and measurement-error biases. This procedure, then, yields a consistent set of estimates of --what we call "bias-free" coefficients --the true partial derivatives of the unknown nonlinear function, which may then be tested by constructing t-tests in the usual way.
An important difference between coefficient drivers and instrumental variables is that a valid instrument requires a relevant variable which is uncorrelated with the misspecification (disturbance), which often proves hard to find. Additionally, such an instrument is also required to be correlated with the relevant independent variable. For a valid driver we need variables that are correlated with the misspecification and we would expect that this is much easier to achieve. (7) contains a unique error term in the form of a term of the intercept. In addition, the errors appear in the state equations (A4 in the appendix). The key assumption to deriving normal inference is that these errors are stationary. However, this is easy to achieve as the coefficient drivers may contain lags of all the variables in the model and hence can always achieve a stationary error process by a sufficiently large number of lags that explain most of the variation in the coefficients. 
Data and results
6 The nonnormal distributions of these coefficients substantially complicate these inference procedures (Swamy et al. (2010, pp. 16-20) ).
We provide estimates of the price-exchange rate relationship (Eq. (7) It is worth emphasizing that the estimation period for our first experiment is such that the countries considered were all in the euro area, and, therefore, had their relative nominal exchange rates locked together. Therefore, one might have expected that all these countries would have the same domestic price level, as this is the implication of the strongest form of PPP. Such an expectation, of course, did not turn out to be true. For example over the period of Greek membership the Greek price level grew by 20 per cent more than the German price level. Hence, PPP could not have held for those two countries. This implies that either we abandon the idea of testing for PPP altogether, or we think of PPP as holding in such a way that allows for other things to be going on at the same time. For example, there may be other variables in the PPP relationship, the exclusion of which would bias the coefficients on the price variables. Thus, while it may be true that in an experiment with changes in the price level, there is a proportionate change in the exchange rate, it may also be true that changing productivity levels and labor market (and other) conditions might drive a wedge in the PPP relationship for an extended period. The generalised cointegration approach outlined above allows for precisely this type of omittedvariable effects.
We begin by estimating the time-varying-coefficient regressions for each country and we test whether the symmetry ( 1 2 b b = − ) and strict proportionality conditions (b 1 = 1 and b 2 = -1) are satisfied using the total-effect coefficients.
However, one or both of these conditions could fail because of misspecifications and inherent biases present in PPP relationship. In such a case, if we are able to remove the biases, then we may possibly obtain the true coefficients, which will establish cointegration within the context of the generalized cointegration framework and which should then allow us to assess homogeneity. Therefore, we subsequently estimate bias-free coefficients to investigate the symmetry and proportionality restrictions. Table 1 reports the average total-effect coefficients for our first experiment.
Total effects
Recall, these coefficients contain specification biases. Several features of these results are noteworthy. First, in the cases of Austria, Belgium, Germany and Greece, the results indicate that the exchange rate (units of euros per unit of the U.S. dollar) is inversely related to domestic prices and positively related to foreign prices. That is, rises in domestic prices and/or falls in foreign prices lead to a nominal appreciation of the domestic currency (i.e., a decrease in the number of units of euros per U. S. dollar) --the opposite of what is predicted by homogeneity. Second, in the cases of France, Italy, Portugal and Spain, as well as for the euro area as a whole, the coefficients on the domestic price level and the foreign price level are correctly signed; an oddity arises, however, from the magnitude of the price coefficients. Although homogeneity states that the price coefficients should be unity (in absolute value), the coefficients for those four countries, as well as for the euro area, are generally very different from unity. For example, in the case of France the coefficient on home prices is 7.8 while the coefficient on foreign prices is -3.7, both of which deviate sharply from unity.
Third, both price coefficients have the same (positive) signs in the case of only one country --that of the Netherlands. Again, however, the price coefficients for the Netherlands are very different from each other and different from unity.
How can we explain these results? Our conjecture is that the causes of the violation of homogeneity are the biases and the misspecifications inherent in the model and the biases that are reflected in the total-effect coefficients.
To shed light on this issue, consider the (monthly) total-effect TVCs presented in Figures 1, 2 and 3 . Consistent with the average TVCs reported in Table 1, We conjecture that the coefficients of PPP could possibly be uninterpretable and biased. This circumstance could occur if, in the short run, there is little movement in prices, but the exchange rate moves by a significant amount. In the very short run, price changes are almost certainly much smoother (and stickier) than movements in nominal exchange rates, so that the relationship between the exchange rate and prices is hard to pin-down empirically. In the limit, if prices did not move at all, and the exchange rate changes, then the coefficients will not be identified. To explain, rewrite Eq. (7) as follows:
Now suppose the following conditions apply: 
Then, Eq. (11) reduces to 1
. So we tend to see symmetry because, in general, over short periods of time changes in prices tend to be much smaller than changes in nominal exchange rates.
What we, therefore, observe is the symmetry of the total-effect coefficient, which has not been corrected for specification biases; this symmetry gives the odd behavior of the coefficients 8 shown in Figures 1 through 3 . We believe that this combination of biased coefficients and lack of identification provides an explanation of the common finding of symmetry of the coefficients in PPP tests. Table 3 shows the results (for the total effects' coefficients) for our second experiment, which uses both the extended country sample and the longer sample period. Again, the picture is very mixed, with little obvious support for PPP. Clearly, the non-euro-zone countries perform no better than those of the euro zone, with many 
Bias-free effects
We now extract the biases from the total coefficients. As described above, this is done by dividing the set of coefficient drivers into two subsets and removing the effect of the group associated with the bias. The coefficient drivers used in each regression are three lags of both the domestic and foreign inflation rates.
9 Table 4 shows the averages of the bias-free coefficients for our first experiment over the euro-zone period. (The t-ratios in Table 4 pertain to the null hypothesis that the betas equal unity.) In all ten cases, the averages of the true coefficients satisfy homogeneity almost exactly; in each case the home-price coefficients are close to unity, while the foreign-price coefficients are close to minus unity. Most of the t-ratios for the coefficients of the domestic prices are close to zero, implying that the coefficient estimates are not significantly different from unity. The standard errors are, however, quite large; this is partly due to the large change in the coefficients in moving from the total effect to the bias free ones.
However, an inspection of monthly bias-free coefficients shown in Figures 7, 8 and 9, shows that the monthly variation in the deviations of coefficients from unity is very high, leading to the rejection of homogeneity in the short run, even though the averages of the bias-free estimates are close to unity in absolute values. Moreover, the odd kind of symmetry that was observed in the total effect coefficients no longer holds for the bias-free coefficients. As noted above, the empirical literature typically rejects PPP over the short run, but sometimes supports PPP in the long-run. Our results can be interpreted as strongly supporting long-run homogeneity, while in the short run that condition is clearly violated.
There are some interesting patterns in the behavior of the monthly coefficients of the bias-free effect. Table 5 shows the correlation between the two price coefficients in each equation. Most countries have fairly low correlations between the two coefficients. So, the symmetry effect, which was evident in the total coefficients, is much less pronounced in the bias-free coefficients; the main exceptions are Greece, where the correlation is almost exactly -1, and Germany and the euro zone, for which in both cases it is around -0.8. However, as reported in Table 4 , averaging these estimates provides coefficients that are almost exactly proportional. Table 6 presents the average estimates of the bias-free coefficients for our second experiment over the longer period. The results of this experiment confirm the results of first experiment; thus, they present a picture that strongly supports PPP.
(Again, the t-ratios repeated in Table 6 pertain to the null hypothesis that the betas equal unity.) All the coefficients are of the correct sign and very close to unity in absolute value.
Consider, for example, the coefficients of the three countries --Canada, Mexico and Japan --that have been added in the second experiment. These three countries have followed very different exchange-rate regimes during the period from the late1950s until early-2011 and have undergone a variety of external and internal shocks.
In terms of exchange-rate regimes, the Canadian dollar, in contrast to most other currencies during the Bretton-Woods period, followed a floating exchange-rate regime until 1962 when it moved to an adjustable-peg regime. With the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system of fixed exchange rates in the early 1970s, both the Canadian dollar and the Japanese yen moved to flexible exchange-rate regimes.
Mexico followed several types of pegged exchange-rate regimes until the mid-1990s, at which time the peso was allowed to float against the U.S. dollar. In terms of asymmetric shocks among these three countries, such shocks including the bursting of the asset price bubble in Japan in the late-1980s and early-1980s, followed a prolonged period of stagnation and deflation. As noted above, Mexico was hit by the Latin American debt crisis in the early 1980s and the attack on the Mexican peso --beginning in December 1994 --which led to a 50 per cent depreciation of the peso against the U.S. dollar (the reference currency under the crawling-peg exchange-rate regime) by March 1995. Yet, despite these (and other shocks), the bias-free coefficients for Canada, Mexico and Japan are all near unity in absolute value, significant, and correctly signed.
These findings clearly mean that a standard analysis based on OLS would yield highly biased results because of the omission of these developments. 
Conclusions
Previous empirical studies have typically rejected the proportionality --or, homogeneity --condition underlying PPP, while providing some support for the symmetry condition. However, the symmetry condition implies that the basic homogeneity of prices and exchange rates inherent in the PPP relationship does not hold. Effectively, symmetry implies that, over time, a change in the nominal exchange rate will not be fully reflected in domestic prices --for example, a 50 per cent depreciation of the nominal exchange rate will not produce a proportional rise in the domestic price level. To be clear, our argument is that symmetry does not imply proportionality.
In this paper, we test for the existence of homogeneity, which we defined as proportionality in the presence of omitted variables, using two sets of experiments, one using data from the euro-zone period and one using data over a much longer period. Using a time-varying-coefficient technique, we found that the (total effect) coefficients, which are not corrected for specification biases, exhibit symmetry, but do not exhibit proportionality. Over the shorter euro-zone period we observe an odd proportional movement in the coefficients --when one coefficient raises the other tends to fall, offsetting the rise in the former coefficient; this effect largely disappears over the longer period. Our interpretation of this finding is that the coefficients are not properly identified. Correcting for specification biases and allowing for missing variables, we find strong support for homogeneity --that is, proportionality in a PPP specification that accounts for the effects of other variables --thus, also providing strong support for PPP. . All coefficients are averages of total effect coefficients; modified tratios are given in brackets. The null hypotheses are 0 0
The standard errors are computed using the full set of coefficient drivers. A is an appropriate subset of coefficient drivers (Appendix). T o t a l e f f e c t c o e f f i c i e n t s , G e r m a n y T o t a l e f f e c t c o e f f i c i e n t s , G r e e c e P A u s P U S C o n P B e l P U S C o n P G e r P U S C o n P G r e P U S C o n T o t a l e f f e c t c o e f f i c i e n t s , S p a i n P S p a P U S C o n P I t a P U S C o n P P o r P U S ConP P F r a P U S C o n T o t a l e f f e c t c o e f f i c i e n t s , T h e N e t h e r l a n d s 10 B i a s -f r e e c o e f f i c i e n t s , G e r m a n y P B e l P U S P G r e P U S P A u s P U S P G e r P U S It is useful at this point to clarify what we believe is the main objective of econometric estimation. In our view, the objective is to consistently estimate the effect on a dependent variable of changing one of its complete set of determinants holding all of the remaining determinants of this set constant. That is, we aim to find consistent estimators of some of these effects. This interpretation is, of course, standard one usually placed on the coefficients of a typical econometric model, but the validity of this interpretation depends crucially on that of the assumption that the conventional model gives estimates of bias-free coefficients, which is not the case in the presence of model misspecification.
To deal with this issue, consider a set of time-varying coefficients that provide a complete explanation of the dependent variable y. contain those regressors of (A1) that take the value zero with probability zero and let another set, denoted by 2 S , contain the remaining regressors of (A1) that take the value zero with positive probability. We call (A1) "the time-varying coefficient (TVC) model". (Note that this model is formulated in terms of the observed variables). The derivation of model (A1) given, for example, in Swamy and Tavlas (2007) shows that 0t
γ is the sum of (i) the relevant intercept, (ii) 0t ν , and (iii) the error term --this term being the correct function of certain 'sufficient sets' of omitted regressors is unique --and for j > 0, jt γ is the sum of (i) the partial derivative of Estimates of nonunique coefficients and predictions of nonunique error terms given by arbitrary error distributions prove nothing. Note, also, that, if the true functional forms are non-linear, the corresponding time-varying partial derivatives may be thought of as the correct representations of the respective data-generating non-linear structures and so they are able to capture any possible function.
It is important to stress that, while we start from a TVC model, its estimation technique is typically referred to in the literature as time-varying-coefficient estimation; the objective here is not to simply estimate a model with changing coefficients. We start from (A1) because this is the correct representation of the underlying data generation process. In the case of the TVC procedure followed in this paper, we extend the standard TVC model typically considered in the literature; specifically, we decompose each of these varying coefficients into two parts, a consistent estimate of the bias-free part and the remaining part, which is due to biases The exact value of t m cannot be known at any time. We assume that t m is larger than K-1 (that is, the total number of determinants is greater than the determinants for which we have observations) and possibly varies over time. , denote these excluded determinants.
Some of these determinants represent all relevant pre-existing conditions so that these conditions are controlled. This is a standard way to reduce spurious correlations to zero. Thus, to make these controls knowledge of relevant pre-existing conditions is 11 That is, the total number of determinants is itself time variant.
we can estimate the biases, which come from the second and third subsets of coefficient drivers. We remove the estimates of biases from the estimates of total coefficients (simply by subtracting these terms from A4) to obtain a consistent estimator of the underlying bias-free components. These second and third subsets of coefficient drivers act rather like the dual of conventional instruments. The key difference, however, is that some of these drivers should be correlated with the misspecifications rather than uncorrelated with an error term, as in the case of instruments, and this should be much easier to achieve in a real world situation.
Swamy, Tavlas, Hall and Hondroyiannis (2010) then give a formal derivation of the inference procedures and confidence intervals for both the coefficients of (A4) and the corresponding TVC's of (A1).
